Prof. Dr. Martin Kesternich

From an economic perspective, the protection of natural resources such as the environment and the climate is a common good. This means that the necessary co-operation is associated with considerable incentive problems: The rational behaviour of the individual does not usually lead to the socially optimal level of environmental or climate protection. The transformation to a low greenhouse gas economy therefore requires major joint efforts, whether for the development of new technologies and solutions or to steer established patterns of behaviour in new directions in the long term.

With our research on cooperation problems, we contribute to the development of good rules and institutions for the efficient use of common goods in climate protection, in particular taking into account behavioural economic methods and findings. We are currently focusing on two topics: the analysis of joint and coordinated action in international climate policy and the investigation of the cooperation behaviour of actors at the downstream levels, primarily with regard to consumers.

Suitable instruments for the creation and establishment of cooperative solutions must not only fulfil the main economic criterion of cost efficiency, but also face a variety of other requirements. These include, for example, the fair distribution of burdens in transformation processes - both internationally and within an economy.

At the same time, our research serves to improve our understanding of how people make decisions and how these influence the effectiveness of climate and energy policy regulation. To this end, we use the opportunity to investigate human decision-making behaviour, for example in laboratory or field experiments.