Wir freuen uns, dass der Artikel „Weighted School Choice Problems and the Weighted Top Trading Cycles Mechanism“ von Nadja Stroh-Maraun zur Veröffentlichung in Mathematical Social Sciences angenommen wurde. Er steht nun online unter https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001 zur Verfügung.
Abstract:
There are a number of school choice problems in which students are heterogeneous according to the number of seats they occupy at the school they are assigned to. We propose a weighted school choice problem by assigning each student a so-called weight and formulate the weighted top trading cycles algorithm (WTTC) to find a matching. The WTTC is strategy-proof and results in a Pareto efficient matching. While the WTTC is a robust extension of the TTC when weights are introduced, it is no longer guaranteed that each student gets a seat at a school even if the overall capacity exceeds the sum of weights. Additionally, the WTTC introduces a trade-off between weights and priorities as a student with a higher weight has a disadvantage to be matched to a particular school compared to a student with the same schools’ priorities but a smaller weight.