Stefan Napel stellt am kommenden Montag (10.6.) seine gemeinsame Arbeit mit Sven Hörner und Alexander Meyer unter folgendem Titel vor: Voting Rules and Voting Success in Weighted Committees and Shareholder Meetings.
Das Seminar zur üblichen Zeit und Stelle statt (Q4.245, 13:00).
Abstract
Collective decisions on more than two alternatives can vary widely in the adopted voting rule. This affects how closely collective choices reflect the preferences of a given individual. We derive a recommendation for whether to use pairwise majority voting, plurality voting, plurality with a runoff vote, or the Borda scoring method if all voters have the same voting weight. If not, then the individually most advantageous rule varies non-monotonically in how many votes one wields relative to others. Computations for the top shareholders in S&P 100 corporations support the result for equal weights nonetheless: plurality rule maximizes the a priori probability of obtaining one’s top choice; Borda rule maximizes the shareholder-specific average rank of the chosen alternative. We also find that the Borda rule translates voting weights into the corresponding measures of voting success the most transparently, and that power indices for binary voting games approximate success in weighted committees rather well.
