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Rationality and Observed Behavior

Presentation by Francesco Cerigioni about „Rationality and Observed Behavior”

On 21st November 2018 (1-2pm) Francesco Cerigioni, assistant professor at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, will give a presentation about “Rationality and Observed Behavior” in Q4.245. Afterwards, Mr. Cerigioni will be available for questions and discussions. His presentation is part of:


Despite its relevance for understanding behavior in strategic interactions, very little consensus has been reached on how to identify subjects’ levels of higher order rationality. To address this, we propose a novel class of two-player games with incomplete information, the e-ring games, that builds on the ring games of Kneeland (2015) and the email game of Rubinstein (1989). We check within subject consistency of identified rationality levels across standard games and find that our games yield rationality levels exhibiting the highest correlation both with the most frequent classification at the individual level, and with an independent measure of cognitive ability.

Die Universität der Informationsgesellschaft