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Flat tax, basic income, and monotonicity properties of redistribition

Presentation by Prof. Dr. André Casajus about „Flat tax, basic income, and monotonicity properties of redistribution“

On 12th November 2018 (1-2pm) André Casajus, research professor at the chair of Economics and Information Systems at the HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, will give a presentation about “Flat tax, basic income, and monotonicity properties of redistribition” in Q4.245. Afterwards, Mr. Casajus will be available for questions and discussions. His presentation is part of: https://wiwi.uni-paderborn.de/dep1/me/research/discussing-research/seam/

Abstract:

This presentation summarizes four papers. Within a simple setup, we first show that proportional taxation is implied by three properties: efficiency (redistribution has no cost), symmetry (members of the society with the same performance obtain the same reward after redistribution), and monotonicity (whenever both the performance of a certain member of the society as well as the overall performance of the society do not decrease, then this member’s reward after redistribution does not decrease). Second, when restricted to non-negative income, these properties imply proportional taxation in a weaker sense—the tax rate may vary with total income but only in an economically reasonable way. Third, we suggest a differential version of monotonicity for redistribution rules: whenever the differential of two persons’ income weakly increases, then the differential of their post-redistribution rewards also weakly increases. Together with efficiency and non-negativity, differential monotonicity characterizes redistribution via taxation at a fixed rate and equal distribution of the total tax revenue, i.e., a flat tax and a basic income. Finally, we suggest a weak version of differential monotonicity for redistribution rules: whenever the differential of two persons’ income weakly increases, then their post-redistribution rewards essentially change in the same direction. Together with efficiency, non-negativity, and the average property, weak differential monotonicity also characterizes redistribution via a flat tax and a basic income.

 

The University for the Information Society