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Comparing Ex-ante Theories in Games with a Unique Mixed Nash Equilibrium

On 16th July 2018 (1-2pm), Philipp Külpmann, assistant professor at the University of Vienna, will give a presentation about “Comparing Ex-ante Theories in Games with a Unique Mixed Nash Equilibrium” in Q4.245. Afterwards, Mr. Külpmann will be available for questions and discussions. His presentation is part of: http://wiwi.uni paderborn.de/department1/seminar-in-economics-management-seam/.

Abstract:

In this paper, we experimentally test the performance of different solution concepts using simple games. We are interested in ex-ante theories, i.e., theories which are not calibrated using experimental data from the same experiment. Among others, we compare Nash Equilibria, Quantal Response Equilibria (QRE) and Level-k Reasoning. It turns out that risk aversion is able to explain most of the deviations from Nash in some games and Nash with risk aversion explains the data better than QRE in these games.

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