On 2nd July 2018 (1-2pm), Clemens Puppe, professor at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology , will give a presentation about “Impact and Participation: A Field Experiment on Voting over Resource Allocation” in Q4.245. Afterwards, Mr. Puppe will be available for questions and discussions. His presentation is part of: http://wiwi.uni paderborn.de/department1/seminar-in-economics-management-seam/.
In voting games, Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcomes are generally sensitive to individuals’ belief. In the context of a simple one-dimensional resource allocation problem, we compare voter participation under the median rule versus the mean rule. While for both voting rules the equilibrium outcome depends on individuals’ beliefs, the maximal impact a voter has under the mean rule is both belief-independent and certain (it depends only on the total number of voters). We test whether this fact leads to higher participation rates under the mean rule as compared to the median rule for which the maximal impact is belief-dependent and uncertain. We find (weak) evidence that voters’ turnout is in fact larger under the mean rule.