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Equilibria under Ambiguity for Belief Functions

On 17th  October 2016 (1-2pm) Jürgen Eichberger, Professor for theory of economics at the University of Heidelberg, will give a presentation about “Equilibria under Ambiguity for Belief Functions" in Q4.245. Afterwards, Mr. Eichberger will be available for questions and discussions. His presentation is part of


We study Equilibria under Ambiguity (EUA) with optimism and pessimism as introduced in Eichberger and Kelsey (2014) for the case of beliefs modelled by belief functions. We show existence of equilibria for finite games with an arbitrary number of players and both general and specific ambiguity about the opponents’ strategy choice. We illustrate by examples the potential of this approach to model behavior which cannot be obtained as a Nash equilibrium

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