Sie haben Javascript deaktiviert!
Sie haben versucht eine Funktion zu nutzen, die nur mit Javascript möglich ist. Um sämtliche Funktionalitäten unserer Internetseite zu nutzen, aktivieren Sie bitte Javascript in Ihrem Browser.

Responsibility-based allocation of cartel damages

On 11th July 2016 (1-2pm) Stefan Napel, Professor at the Chair for Economics especially for Microeconomics at the University of Bayreuth will give a presentation about “Responsibility-based allocation of cartel damages" in Q4.245. Afterwards, Mr. Napel will be available for questions and discussions. His presentation is part of

Anti-trust infringers are liable jointly and severally. Any member of a cartel may be sued and forced to pay compensation to a victim on behalf of all. EU law grants the singled-out cartelist a right to obtain redress from its former collaborators, and stipulates that every infringer’s share of the compensation must reflect its “relative responsibility” for the damage. Several intuitive requirements recommend the Shapley value for quantifying this responsibility in case of price overcharges on differentiated goods. We characterize the resulting allocations for linear market environments. Bounds, which may prove useful for negotiating settlements, are identified. We compare the extent to which simple heuristics, such as damage division by market shares, provide good approximations of the Shapley allocation.


Die Universität der Informationsgesellschaft