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Publications - Journal Articles


Open list in Research Information System

2018

Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?

A.E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, B. Hoyer, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2018)

Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed. We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013).


The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information

C. Haake, S. Recker, Group Decision and Negotiation (2018), pp. 905-932

In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness.


Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment

B. Hoyer, S. Rosenkranz, Games (2018)


Human-induced climate change: the impact of land-use change

T. Gries, M. Redlin, J.E. Ugarte, Theoretical and Applied Climatology (2018)

DOI


New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe

I.W. Kolodziej, A.R. Reichert, H. Schmitz, Health services research (2018)


Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate

B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C. Haake, S. Recker, PLoS ONE (2018)

In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously. To prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to reduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this study we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries when customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model, a service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to evaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is not able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous rating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three sales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality decisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of receiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service provider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation building process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental design we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates from optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation profile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking strategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price is high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then high quality is chosen until the price increases again.


Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves

K. De Jaegher, B. Hoyer, Journal of Conflict Resolution (2018)

We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).


Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market

D. Kaimann, B. Hoyer, Applied Economics Letters (2018), pp. 54-57

We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.


2017

Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy

T. Gries, M. Redlin, Defence and Peace Economics (2017), pp. 1-15

DOI


Slow Booms and Deep Busts: 160 Years of Business Cycles in Spain

T. Gries, F. Marlon, Y. Feng, Review of Economics (2017), pp. 153-166


The effects of competition on medical service provision

J. Brosig-Koch, B. Hehenkamp, J. Kokot, Health Economics (2017), pp. 6-20

We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient‐optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee‐for‐service. Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced with fee‐for‐service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related experimental research on price competition.


Technology diffusion, international integration and participation in developing economies - a review of major concepts and findings

T. Gries, R. Grundmann, I. Palnau, M. Redlin, International Economics and Economic Policy (2017), pp. 215-253

DOI


Slow Booms and Deep Busts: 160 Years of Business Cycles in Spain

T. Gries, M. Fritz, Y. Feng, Review of Economics (2017), pp. 153-166


On the interdependence of ambulatory and hospital care in the German health system

T. Büyükdurmus, T. Kopetsch, H. Schmitz, H. Tauchmann, Health economics review (2017), pp. 2


Informal Care and Long-term Labor Market Outcomes

H. Schmitz, M. Westphal, Journal of Health Economics 56, 1-18 (2017)


Innovations, growth and participation in advanced economies - a review of major concepts and findings

T. Gries, R. Grundmann, I. Palnau, M. Redlin, International Economics and Economic Policy (2017), pp. 293-351

DOI


Sick already? Job loss makes it even worse

H. Schmitz, V. Schiele, Atlas of Science (2017)


Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change

T. Gries, S. Jungblut, '. Krieger, H. Meyer, German Economic Review (2017)


2016

Quantile treatment effects of job loss on health

V. Schiele, H. Schmitz, Journal of Health Economics (2016), pp. 59--69


Strategic Network Disruption and Defense

B. Hoyer, K. De Jaegher, Journal of Public Economic Theory (2016), pp. 802-830

We study a game between a network designer, who uses costly links to connect nodes in a network, and a network disruptor who tries to disrupt the resulting network as much as possible by deleting either nodes or links. For low linking costs networks with all nodes in symmetric positions are a best response of the designer under both link deletion and node deletion. For high linking costs the designer builds a star network under link deletion, but for node deletion excludes some nodes from the network to build a smaller but stronger network. For intermediate linking costs the designer again builds a symmetric network under node deletion but a star‐like network with weak spots under link deletion.


Determinants of regional variation in health expenditures in Germany

D. Göpffarth, T. Kopetsch, H. Schmitz, Health economics (2016), pp. 801--815


By-product mutualism and the ambiguous effects of harsher environments – A game-theoretic model

K. De Jaegher, B. Hoyer, Journal of Theoretical Biology (2016), pp. 82-97

We construct two-player two-strategy game-theoretic models of by-product mutualism, where our focus lies on the way in which the probability of cooperation among players is affected by the degree of adversity facing the players. In our first model, cooperation consists of the production of a public good, and adversity is linked to the degree of complementarity of the players׳ efforts in producing the public good. In our second model, cooperation consists of the defense of a public, and/or a private good with by-product benefits, and adversity is measured by the number of random attacks (e.g., by a predator) facing the players. In both of these models, our analysis confirms the existence of the so-called boomerang effect, which states that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally defect in a situation of joint cooperation. Focusing on such an effect in isolation leads to the "common-enemy" hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity increases the probability of cooperation. Yet, we also find that a sucker effect may simultaneously exist, which says that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally cooperate in a situation of joint defection. Looked at in isolation, the sucker effect leads to the competing hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity decreases the probability of cooperation. Our analysis predicts circumstances in which the "common enemy" hypothesis prevails, and circumstances in which the competing hypothesis prevails.


Sustainability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition

S. Brangewitz, S. Brockhoff, European Journal of Political Economy (2016), pp. 1-23

DOI


Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War

T. Gries, C. Haake, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy (2016), pp. 377 - 384

DOI


Public reporting and the quality of care of German nursing homes

A. Herr, T. Nguyen, H. Schmitz, Health Policy (2016), pp. 1162--1170


Competition of Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly

S. Brangewitz, J. Manegold, Theoretical Economics Letters (2016), pp. 1341-1362

On an intermediate goods market with asymmetric production technologies as well as vertical and horizontal product differentiation we analyze the influence of simultaneous competition for resources and customers. The intermediaries face either price or quantity competition on the output market and a monopolistic, strategically acting supplier on the input market. We find that there exist quality and productivity differences such that for quantity competition only one intermediary is willing to procure inputs from the input supplier, while for price competition both intermediaries are willing to purchase inputs. Moreover, the well-known welfare advantage of price competition can in general be no longer confirmed in our model with an endogenous input market and asymmetric intermediaries.


Explaining inter-provincial migration in China

T. Gries, M.. Kraft, M. Simon, Papers in Regional Science (2016), pp. 709-731


Reanalyzing Zero Returns to Education in Germany

D.A. Kamhöfer, H. Schmitz, Journal of Applied Econometrics (2016), pp. 912-919

DOI


Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Booms and Busts‐Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics

T. Gries, F. Marlon, Y. Feng, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. (2016)


2015

Changes of China’s agri-food exports to Germany caused by its accession to WTO and the 2008 financial crisis

T. Gries, Y. Feng, Z. Guo, China Agricultural Economic Review (2015), pp. 262-279


Robust Equilibria in Location Games

B. Buechel, N. Röhl, European Journal of Operational Research (2015), pp. 505-517

In the framework of spatial competition, two or more players strategically choose a locationin order to attract consumers. It is assumed standardly that consumers with the same favorite location fully agree on the ranking of all possible locations. To investigate the necessity of this questionable and restrictive assumption, we model heterogeneity in consumers’ distance perceptions by individual edge lengths of a given graph. A profile of location choices is called a “robust equilibrium” if it is a Nash equilibrium in several games which differ only by the consumers’ perceptions of distances. For a finite number of players and any distribution of consumers, we provide a full characterization of all robust equilibria and derive structural conditions for their existence. Furthermore, we discuss whether the classical observations of minimal differentiation and inefficiency are robust phenomena. Thereby, we find strong support for an old conjecture that in equilibrium firms form local clusters.


Sustaining Civil Peace: a configurational comparative analysis

T. Gries, I. Palnau, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy (2015), pp. 467 -478


Rationalisierung vs. Rationierung Ist die Rationierung unvermeidbar?

H. Schmitz, Patient Gesundheitswesen – Mission 2030 Unsere gemeinsame Verantwortung die Zukunft zu gestalten (2015)


Short-and medium-term effects of informal care provision on female caregivers’ health

H. Schmitz, M. Westphal, Journal of health economics (2015), pp. 174--185


Oppressive Governments, Dependence on the United States and Anti-American Terrorism

T. Gries, D. Meierrieks, M. Redlin, Oxford Economic Papers (2015), pp. 83 - 103


Playing the Lottery or Dressing Up? A Model of Firm-Level Heterogeneity and the Decision to Export

T. Gries, W. Naudé, N. Bilkic, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance (2015), pp. 1-17


2014

Household Savings and Productive Capital Formation in Rural Vietnam: Insurance vs. Social Network

T. Gries, H.V. Dung, Modern Economy (2014)


Too Much of a Good Thing? Welfare Consequences of Market Transparency

Y. Gu, B. Hehenkamp, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (2014), pp. 225-248

This paper studies welfare consequences of consumer-side market transparency with endogenous entry of firms. Different from most studies, we consider the unique symmetric entry equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies. We identify two effects of market transparency on welfare: a competition effect and a novel market-structure effect. We show, surprisingly, that for almost all demand functions the negative market-structure effect eventually dominates the positive competition effect as the market becomes increasingly transparent. Consumer-side market transparency can therefore be socially excessive even without collusion. The only exception among commonly used demand functions is the set of constant demand functions.


Kehrtwende in der Gesundheitspolitik - Unnötige Abkehr von einer erfolgreichen Reform zur Finanzierung der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung

H. Schmitz, B. Augurzky, U. Roppel, RWI Position (2014)


Collective action and the common enemy effect

K. De Jaegher, B. Hoyer, Defence and Peace Economics (2014), pp. 644-664

How is collective defence by players affected when they face a threat from an intelligent attacker rather than a natural threat? This paper analyses this question using a game-theoretic model. Facing an intelligent attacker has an effect if players move first and visibly set their defence strategies, thereby exposing any players who do not defend, and if the attacker is, moreover, not able to commit to a random attack. Depending on the parameters of the game, the presence of an intelligent attacker either increases the probability that players jointly defend (where such joint defence either does or does not constitute a utilitarian optimum), or decreases the probability that players jointly defend (even though joint defence is a utilitarian optimum).


Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games

S. Brangewitz, J. Gamp, Economic Theory (2014), pp. 529-554

DOI


A Crook is a Crook … But is He Still a Crook Abroad? On the Effect of Immigration on Destination-Country Corruption

E. Dimant, T. Krieger, M. Redlin, German Economic Review (2014), pp. 464-489

DOI


Trade and fertility in the developing world: the impact of trade and trade structure

T. Gries, R. Grundmann, Journal of Population Economics (2014), pp. 1165-1186


Regional variation in the utilisation of ambulatory services in Germany

T. Kopetsch, H. Schmitz, Health economics (2014), pp. 1481--1492


Broke, ill, and obese: is there an effect of household debt on health?

M. Keese, H. Schmitz, Review of Income and Wealth (2014), pp. 525--541


Testing the relationship between income inequality and life expectancy: A simple correction for the aggregation effect when using aggregated data

T. Mayrhofer, H. Schmitz, Journal of Population Economics (2014), pp. 841--856


Oppressive governments, dependence on the USA, and anti-American terrorism

T. Gries, D. Meierrieks, M. Redlin, Oxford Economic Papers (2014), pp. 83-103

DOI


2013

Health and the double burden of full-time work and informal care provision—Evidence from administrative data

H. Schmitz, M.A. Stroka, Labour Economics (2013), pp. 305--322


Unsustainable Sovereign Debt - Is the Euro Crisis only the Tip of the Iceberg?

T. Gries, N. Bilkic, B. Carerras Painter, International Economics and Economic Policy (2013), pp. 1 - 45


Global Asymmetries and their Implications for Climate and Industrial Policies, in: Pathways to Industrialization in the Twenty-First Century - New Challenges and Emerging Paradigms

T. Gries, Oxford University Press (2013), pp. 293-323


Do banking crises cause terrorism?

T. Gries, D. Meierrieks, Economics Letters (2013), pp. 321-324


Practice budgets and the patient mix of physicians-Evaluating the effects of remuneration system reforms on physician behaviour in Germany

H. Schmitz, Journal of Health Economics (2013), pp. 1240-1249


What accounts for the regional differences in the utilisation of hospitals in Germany?

B. Augurzky, T. Kopetsch, H. Schmitz, The European Journal of Health Economics (2013), pp. 615--627


Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs

S. Brangewitz, J. Gamp, Economics Letters (2013), pp. 224-227

DOI


2012

Stay in school or start working?- The human capital investment decision under uncertainty and irreversibility

T. Gries, N.. Bilkic, Labour Economics (2012), pp. 706 - 717


Negotiating Transfer Prices

C. Haake, J.T. Martini, Group Decision and Negotiation (2012), pp. 657-680

DOI


On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU

C. Haake, T. Krieger, S. Minter, International Economics and Economic Policy (2012), pp. 583-612

DOI


More health care utilization with more insurance coverage? Evidence from a latent class model with German data

H. Schmitz, Applied Economics (2012), pp. 4455--4468


Regionale Unterschiede in der stationären Versorgung: Das ländliche Krankenhaus im Fokus

H. Schmitz, B. Augurzky, A. Beivers, Krankenhaus-Report 2012 (2012)


Causality Between Terrorism and Economic Growth

T. Gries, D. Meierrieks, Journal of Peace Research (2012), pp. 91 - 104


2011

SME Performance in Transition Economies: The Financial Regulation and Firm Level Corruption Nexus

T. Gries, A. Wieneke, Journal of Comparative Economics (2011), pp. 221 - 229


Causal Linkages Between Domestic Terrorism and Economic Growth

T. Gries, T. Krieger, D. Meierrieks, Defence and Peace Economics (2011), pp. 493 - 508


Why are the unemployed in worse health? The causal effect of unemployment on health

H. Schmitz, Labour Economics (2011), pp. 71--78


Profit efficiency and ownership of German hospitals

A. Herr, H. Schmitz, B. Augurzky, Health Economics (2011), pp. 660--674


Entrepreneurship and Human Development - A Capability Approach.

T. Gries, W. Naudé, Journal of Public Economics (2011), pp. 216 - 224


Income Determination and Income Discrimination in Shenzhen

T. Gries, S. Gravemeyer, J. Xue, Urban Studies (2011), pp. 1457-1475


What determines influenza vaccination take-up of elderly Europeans?

H. Schmitz, A. Wübker, Health Economics (2011), pp. 1281--1297


Financial Deepening, Trade Openness and Economic Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean

T. Gries, M. Kraft, D. Meierrieks, Applied Economics (2011), pp. 4729 - 4739


Direct evidence of risk aversion as a source of advantageous selection in health insurance

H. Schmitz, Economics Letters (2011), pp. 180--182


Paying for Performance in Hospitals

B. Hehenkamp, O. Kaarboe, Economic Analysis and Policy (2011), pp. 49-70

DOI


Proportionality and the power of unequal parties

D. Dimitrov, C. Haake, International Journal of Economic Theory (2011), pp. 189-200

In this paper we introduce the concept of an overall power function that is meant to combine two sources of a party’s power in a parliament. The first source is based on the possibilities for the party to be part of a majority coalition and it is typically modeled using a cooperative simple game. The second source takes into account parties’ asymmetries outside the cooperative game and it is displayed by a vector of exogenously given weights. We adopt a normative point of view and provide an axiomatic characterization of a specific overall power function, in which the weights enter in a proportional fashion.


2010

Entrepreneurship and Structural Economic Transformation

T. Gries, W. Naudé, Small Business Economics (2010), pp. 13 - 29


On the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in finite populations

B. Hehenkamp, A. Possajennikov, T. Guse, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2010), pp. 254-258

DOI


Strategic Unemployment

J. Angerhausen, C. Bayer, B. Hehenkamp, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) (2010), pp. 439-461


International integration and the determinants of regional development in China

T. Gries, M. Redlin, Economic Change and Restructuring (2010), pp. 149-177

DOI


Survival at the center—the stability of minimum differentiation

B. Hehenkamp, A. Wambach, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2010), pp. 853--858


2009

China's provincial disparities and the determinants of provincial inequality

T. Gries, M. Redlin, Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies (2009), pp. 259-281

DOI


Explaining Regional Export Performance in a Developing Country: The Role of Geography and Relative Factor Endowments

T. Gries, W. Naudé, Regional Studies (2009), pp. 967-979


Linkages between Financial Deepening, Trade Openness and Economic Development: Causality Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa

T. Gries, M. Kraft, D. Meierrieks, World Development (2009), pp. 1849-1860


The Optimal Distance to Port for Exporting Firms

T. Gries, W. Naudé, Journal of Regional Science (2009), pp. 513-528


Entrepreneurship and regional economic growth: towards a general theory of start-ups, Innovation

T. Gries, W. Naudé, The European Journal of Social Science Research (2009), pp. 309-328


DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES

C. Haake, International Game Theory Review (2009), pp. 15-32

We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among themselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the specifications, this procedure serves to achieve bargaining solutions such as the discrete Raiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The latter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is readily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential.


2008

Two support results for the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets

C. Haake, Mathematical Social Sciences (2008), pp. 177-187

DOI


Regional Determinants of Entrepreneurial Start-Ups in a Developing Country

T. Gries, W. Naudé, E. Wood, A. Meintjes, Entrepreneurship & Regional Development (2008), pp. 111-124


Trade and Endogenous Formation of Regions in a Developing Country

T. Gries, W. Naudé, Review of Developing Economics (2008), pp. 248-275


Stable governments and the semistrict core

D. Dimitrov, C. Haake, Games and Economic Behavior (2008), pp. 460-475

DOI


The Shapley value of phylogenetic trees

C. Haake, A. Kashiwada, F.E. Su, Journal of Mathematical Biology (2008), pp. 479-497

DOI


Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts

C. Haake, B. Klaus, Economic Theory (2008), pp. 393-410

DOI


Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples

C. Haake, B. Klaus, Theory and Decision (2008), pp. 537-554

DOI


On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules

C. Haake, W. Trockel, Review of Economic Design (2008), pp. 17-25

DOI


Comments on: Transversality of the Shapley value

C. Haake, TOP (2008), pp. 48-50

DOI


Imitators and optimizers in a changing environment

B. Hehenkamp, O.M. Kaarbøe, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (2008), pp. 1357-1380

DOI


2007

Die Grundlagen der Mechanismus-Design-Theorie

B. Hehenkamp, Wirtschaftsdienst (2007), pp. 768-772

DOI


Employment Effects of International Factor Mobility - A Theoretical Approach with Heterogenous Labor

T. Gries, S. Jungblut, Journal of Economic Integration (2007), pp. 339-368


A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions

D. Dimitrov, C. Haake, Social Choice and Welfare (2007), pp. 571-579

DOI


2006

Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods

C. Haake, B. Klaus, D. Dimitrov, Economics Letters (2006), pp. 106-110


The strategic advantage of interdependent preferences in rent-seeking contests

T. Guse, B. Hehenkamp, Public Choice (2006), pp. 323-352

DOI


When Should the Talented Receive Weaker Incentives? Peer Pressure in Teams

B. Hehenkamp, O. Kaarboe, FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis (2006), pp. 124-148

DOI


Government versus Opposition: Who Should be Who in the 16th German Bundestag?

D. Dimitrov, C. Haake, Journal of Economics (2006), pp. 115-128

DOI


2005

Trading bargaining weights

C. Haake, U. Ervig, Journal of Mathematical Economics (2005), pp. 983-993


Max number of publications reached - all publications can be found in our Research Infomation System.

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Publications - Working Papers, Reports, Monographys


Open list in Research Information System

2018

Thoughts on Social Design

W. Trockel, C. Haake, in: Studies in Economic Design, Springer, 2018



On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem

C. Haake, C. Qin, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018


Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games

S. Hoof, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018


2017

Preis, Service oder Leistungen: Was beeinflusst besonders die Krankenkassenwahl von gesetzlich Versicherten?

H. Schmitz, in: Krankenversicherung im Rating, Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, 2017


Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets

B. Hehenkamp, O. Kaarboe, Universität Paderborn, 2017


Evolutionary Equilibrium in Stochastic Contests - Entry, Effort, and Overdissipation

Y. Gu, B. Hehenkamp, W. Leininger, Universität Paderborn, 2017




Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse

B. Hoyer, N. Stroh-Maraun, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2017

In actual school choice applications the theoretical underpinnings of the Boston School Choice Mechanism (BM) (complete information and rationality of the agents) are often not given. We analyze the actual behavior of agents in such a matching mechanism, using data from the matching mechanism currently used in a clearinghouse at a faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the BM is used, and supplement this data with data generated in a survey among students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 70% of students act strategically. Controlling for students' limited information, we find that they do act rationally in their decision to act strategically. While students thus seem to react to the incentives to act strategically under the BM, they do not seem to be able to use this to their own advantage. However, those students acting in line with their beliefs manage a significantly better personal outcome than those who do not. We also run simulations by using a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm, adapted to our situation, to show that the use of a different algorithm may be to the students' advantage.


2016

Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product Innovation

J. Manegold, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2016


Do talented women shy away from competition?

B. Hoyer, T. van Huizen, L. Keijzer, T. Rezai Khavas, S. Rosenkranz, 2016

We study the willingness to compete in a cognitive task among an entire cohort of fresh man business and economics students. Combining data from a lab-in-thefield experiment with university admissions data, we trace the gender gap in competitiveness at different levels of high school performance. Our results confirm that, on average, men choose to compete more often. The gender gap disappears, however, among students with above average high school performance. Female high school top performers are equally competitive as their male counterparts. In fact, the overall gender gap is entirely driven by the group of female high school underperformers who shied away from competition, even when they performed well in our task. Overall, our findings suggest that high school grades are more than just a signal of cognitive abilities, because they seem to influence the receivers selfperception of his or her performance in a competitive environment involved in later on in life.


2015

Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks

S. Brangewitz, C. Haake, P. Möhlmeier, Universität Paderborn, 2015




Note on the Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption

B. Hoyer, H. Haller, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics., 2015

Social psychology studies the "common enemy effect", the phenomenon that members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario is the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider appears who aims to disrupt the information flow within the network by deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds to this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage costs, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive common enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage costs, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient in the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and inefficient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy effect.



2014


Low Carbon Economics - Theory and application

T. Gries, in: Low Carbon Economics , 2014, pp. 361 - 382



Maritime Piracy: Socio-Economic, Political, and Institutional Determinants

T. Gries, M. Redlin, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics, 2014



2013


A crook is a crook ... but is he still a crook abroad? On the effect of immigration on destination-country corruption

E. Dimant, T.. Krieger, M. Redlin, Wilfried-Guth-Stiftungsprofessur für Ordnungs- und Wettbewerbspolitik, Universität Freiburg, 2013


Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information

S. Brangewitz, C. Haake, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013




2012


Add-On Premiums Increase Price Transparency: More Policy Holders Switch Health Plans

H. Schmitz, P. Eibich, N. Ziebarth, in: DIW Economic Bulletin, 2nd ed., German Institute for Economic Research, 2012, pp. 15-24


Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect

B. Hoyer, K. De Jaegher, 2012

The phenomenon that groups or people work together when they face an opponent, although they have little in common otherwise, has been termed the "common enemy effect". We study a model of network formation, where players can use links to build a network, knowing that they are facing a common enemy who can disrupt the links within the network, and whose goal it is to minimize the sum of the benefits of the network. We find that introducing a common enemy can lead to the formation of stable and efficient networks as well as fragmented networks and the empty network.


2011

Trade Openness and Economic Growth: A Panel Causality Analysis

T. Gries, M. Redlin, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics, 2011, pp. 24


Internationale Umweltpolitik bei akkumulierender und asymmetrischer Verschmutzungsdynamik

T. Gries, in: Zukunftsfähige Wirtschaftspolitik für Deutschland und Europa, 2011, pp. 215 - 246


Zusatzbeiträge erhöhen die Preistransparenz: mehr Versicherte wechseln die Krankenkasse

H. Schmitz, P. Eibich, N. Ziebarth, in: Wochenbericht, German Institute for Economic Research, 2011, pp. 3-12


2010

Short-run and Long-run Dynamics of Growth,Inequality and Poverty in the Developing World

T. Gries, M. Redlin, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics, 2010, pp. 21


Effizienz Deutscher Krankenhäuser im Zeitablauf

H. Schmitz, B. Augurzky, 2010


2008

China’s provincial disparities and the determinants of provincial inequality

T. Gries, M. Redlin, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics, 2008, pp. 45


International integration and regional development in China

T. Gries, M. Redlin, WIDER Research Papers, United Nations University (UNU), 2008, pp. 37


2007

Educational Disparity and Income Inequality in Urban China

T. Gries, J. Xue, in: The Economic Science, 2007, pp. 101 -116


Global Shift – The European Union, the United States, and the Emergence of China

T. Gries, in: 50 Years of EU Economic Dynamics, Springer, 2007


2005


Endogenous Formation of Regions in Developing Countries

T. Gries, in: Journal of Development Perspective, 2005


Rent a Bureaucrat

T. Gries, G. Sievert, A. Wieneke, in: H.-G. Napp, Finanzwissenschaft im Wandel, Bern, 2005


2004

On Global Economic Growth and the Prospects for Africa to Catch Up, in: Gilroy, B.M., Gries, T.,Naude, W. (Eds.)

T. Gries, W. Naudé, in: Multinational Enterprises, Foreign Direct Investment and Growth in Africa: South African Perspectives, 2004


Obstacles Facing German Enterprises in South Africa, in: Gilroy, B.M., Gries, T., Naude, W. (Eds.)

B.M. Gilroy, G. Thomas, W. Naudé, K. Schmidt, in: Multinational Enterprises, Foreign Direct Investment and Growth in Africa: South AfricanPerspectives, 2004


Employment Effects of Foreign Direct Investments - a Theoretical Analysis with Heterogenous Labour, in Gilroy, N.M., Gries, T., Naudé, W. (Eds.)

T. Gries, S. Jungblut, in: Multinational enterprises, Foreign Direct Investment and Growth in Africa : South-African Perspectives ; with 22 tables, 2004, pp. 229 - 245


2003

Neue Wachstums- und Innovationspolitik in Europa

T. Gries, A. Jungmittag, P. Welfens, Physica-Verlag, 2003


2002


2001


1999

Globalization, Economic Growth and Innovation Dynamics

T. Gries, J. Addison, D. Audretsch, H. Grupp, P. Welfens, 1999


1998



Economic Aspects of Digital Information Technology

T. Gries, L. Suhl, DUV 1998, 1998


1997



1996


1995



1990


1989


Open list in Research Information System

The University for the Information Society