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Prodekan für Forschung

Prof. Dr. Rene Fahr

Contact
Publications
Prof. Dr. Rene Fahr

Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Head - Professor - Wiss. Direktor des Experimentallabors der WiWi-Fakultät (BaER-Lab)

Phone:
+49 5251 60-2090
Fax:
+49 5251 60-3550
Office:
Q3.122
Office hours:

Nach Vereinbarung. Bitte melden Sie sich zur Terminvereinbarung im Sekretariat.

Web:
Web(external):
Visitor:
Warburger Str. 100
33098 Paderborn
Postal Address:
Warburger Str. 100
33098 Paderborn

Paderborn University

Vice President - Professor - Knowledge- and Technologytransfer

Phone:
+49 5251 60-2090
Fax:
+49 5251 60-3550
Office:
Q3.122
Office hours:

nach Vereinbarung. Bitte melden Sie sich zur Terminvereinbarung im Sekretariat.

Web:
Visitor:
Warburger Str. 100
33098 Paderborn
Postal Address:
Warburger Str. 100
33098 Paderborn


Open list in Research Information System

2018

Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate

B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C. Haake, S. Recker, PLoS ONE (2018), 13(11)

In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously. To prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to reduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this study we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries when customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model, a service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to evaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is not able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous rating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three sales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality decisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of receiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service provider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation building process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental design we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates from optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation profile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking strategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price is high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then high quality is chosen until the price increases again.


2017

Study? Now! - Evaluation einer gamifizierten App zur Überwindung von akademischer Prokrastination

K. Klingsieck, A. Bomm, B. Djawadi, R. Fahr, M. Feldotto, T. John, D. Kundisch, A. Skopalik. Study? Now! - Evaluation einer gamifizierten App zur Überwindung von akademischer Prokrastination. 2017.


2015

Kleine Unternehmen - kleine Verantwortung? Theorie und Praxis unternehmerischer Verantwortung im Mittelstand

R. Fahr, D. Foit, in: BWL im Mittelstand - Grundlagen-Besonderheiten-Entwicklungen",1st ed., W. Kohlhammer-Verlag, 2015, pp. Chapter 4.6.1


“…and they are really lying”: Clean Evidence on the Pervasiveness of Cheating in Professional Contexts from a Field Experiment.

R. Fahr, B. Mir Djawadi, Journal of Economic Psychology (2015), pp. 48-59

We investigate the pervasiveness of lying in professional contexts such as insurance fraud, tax evasion and untrue job applications. We argue that lying in professional contexts share three characterizing features: (1) the gain from the dishonest behavior is uncertain, (2) the harm that lying may cause to the other party is only indirect and (3) lies are more indirect lies by action or written statements. Conducted as a field experiment with a heterogenous group of participants during a University ‘‘Open House Day’’, our ‘‘gumball-machineexperiment’’ provides field evidence on how preferences for lying are shaped in situations typically found in professional contexts which we consider to be particularly prone to lying behavior compared to other contexts. As a key innovation, our experimental design allows measuring exact levels of cheating behavior under anonymous conditions. We find clean evidence that cheating is prevalent across all sub groups and that more than 32% of the population cheats for their own gain. However, an analysis of the cheating rates with respect to highest educational degree and professional status reveals that students cheat more than non-students. This finding warrants a careful interpretation of generalizing laboratory findings with student subjects about the prevalence of cheating in the population.


2014



"Conceptual Model and Economic Experiments to Explain Nonpersistence and Enable Mechanism Designs Fosterin Behavioral Change"

B.M. Djawadi, R. Fahr, F. Turk, Value in Health (2014), 17 (8), pp. 814-822


Vom Wollen und Können ethischen Entscheidens

R. Fahr. Vom Wollen und Können ethischen Entscheidens. 2014.



Conceptual Model and Economic Experiments to Explain Nonpersistence and Enable Mechanism Designs Fosterin Behavioral Change

B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, F. Turk, Value in Health (2014)(8), pp. 814-822

BackgroundMedical nonpersistence is a worldwide problem of striking magnitude. Although many fields of studies including epidemiology, sociology, and psychology try to identify determinants for medical nonpersistence, comprehensive research to explain medical nonpersistence from an economics perspective is rather scarce.ObjectivesThe aim of the study was to develop a conceptual framework that augments standard economic choice theory with psychological concepts of behavioral economics to understand how patients’ preferences for discontinuing with therapy arise over the course of the medical treatment. The availability of such a framework allows the targeted design of mechanisms for intervention strategies.MethodsOur conceptual framework models the patient as an active economic agent who evaluates the benefits and costs for continuing with therapy. We argue that a combination of loss aversion and mental accounting operations explains why patients discontinue with therapy at a specific point in time. We designed a randomized laboratory economic experiment with a student subject pool to investigate the behavioral predictions.ResultsSubjects continue with therapy as long as experienced utility losses have to be compensated. As soon as previous losses are evened out, subjects perceive the marginal benefit of persistence lower than in the beginning of the treatment. Consequently, subjects start to discontinue with therapy.ConclusionsOur results highlight that concepts of behavioral economics capture the dynamic structure of medical nonpersistence better than does standard economic choice theory. We recommend that behavioral economics should be a mandatory part of the development of possible intervention strategies aimed at improving patients’ compliance and persistence behavior.


2013



Individual determinants of work attendance: Evidence on the role of personality

S. St{\, R. Fahr, Applied Economics (2013)(19), pp. 2863--2875



2011


2009

Gender differentials in skill use and skill formation in the aftermath of vocational training

R. Fahr, U. Sunde, Applied Economics Letters (2009)(9), pp. 885--889


2008


Identifying personality traits to enhance trust between organisations: An experimental approach

R. Fahr, B. Irlenbusch, Managerial and Decision Economics (2008)(6), pp. 469--487


2007



2006

Regional dependencies in job creation: an efficiency analysis for Western Germany

R. Fahr, U. Sunde, Applied Economics (2006)(10), pp. 1193--1206



2005

Job and vacancy competition in empirical matching functions

R. Fahr, U. Sunde, Labour Economics (2005)(6), pp. 773--780


Loafing or learning?—the demand for informal education

R. Fahr, European Economic Review (2005)(1), pp. 75--98


2004

Occupational job creation: patterns and implications

R. Fahr, U. Sunde, Oxford Economic Papers (2004)(3), pp. 407--435



2003


2002

Transferability, mobility and youth training in Germany and Britain: A simple theoretical analysis

D. Clark, R. Fahr, KONJUNKTURPOLITIK-BERLIN- (2002)(3/4), pp. 235--255


2001

Gibt es eine Nachfrage nach produktiver Freizeit

R. Fahr, Statistisches Bundesamt (Hrsg.), Spektrum Bundesstatistik (2001)


The promise of workplace training for non-college-bound youth: Theory and evidence from German apprenticeship

D. Clark, R. Fahr, CEP Discussion Paper No. 528 (2001), 528


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