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Prof. Dr. Claus-Jochen Haake

Prof. Dr. Claus-Jochen Haake

Economics, especially Microeconomics

Head - Professor

+49 5251 60-3378
+49 5251 60-3365
Office hours:

Mon 9-10 am

Warburger Str. 100
33098 Paderborn
Postal Address:
Warburger Str. 100
33098 Paderborn

Sonderforschungsbereich 901

Deputy Speaker - Professor - Principal Investigator

Center of International Economics


06/2017 - today

Head of Doctorate Committeee

10/2015 - today

Board Member CRC 901 "On-The-Fly Computing"

04/2009 - today

Professor for Economics, esp. Microeconomics, Paderborn University

10/2011 - 10/2015

Vice Dean for Research

10/2008 - 03/2009

Substitute Professor for Economics, esp. Microeconomics, Paderborn University

06/2003 - 09/2008

Assistant Professor, Institute for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

06/2004 - 08/2004

Visiting Scholar, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

02/2004 - 05/2004

Visiting Scholar, Harvey Mudd College, USA

04/1998 - 05/2003

Research Assistant, Institute for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University


Phd. (Dr. rer. pol.), Institute for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University


Diloma Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Open list in Research Information System


The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information

C. Haake, S. Recker, Group Decision and Negotiation (2018), pp. 905-932

In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness.

Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value

M. Feldotto, C. Haake, A. Skopalik, N. Stroh-Maraun, in: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6

We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted) average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation profiles are incomplete.

Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate

B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C. Haake, S. Recker, PLoS ONE (2018)

In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously. To prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to reduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this study we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries when customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model, a service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to evaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is not able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous rating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three sales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality decisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of receiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service provider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation building process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental design we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates from optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation profile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking strategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price is high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then high quality is chosen until the price increases again.

Thoughts on Social Design

W. Trockel, C. Haake, in: Studies in Economic Design, Springer, 2018

On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem

C. Haake, C. Qin, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018

Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences

C. Haake, N. Stroh-Maraun, Economics Letters (2018), pp. 39 - 41

We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.


Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War

T. Gries, C. Haake, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy (2016), pp. 377 - 384



Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks

S. Brangewitz, C. Haake, P. Möhlmeier, Universität Paderborn, 2015


Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service

J. Künsemöller, S. Brangewitz, H. Karl, C. Haake, in: Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC), 2014, pp. 203-210

This paper explores how cloud provider competition influences instance pricing in an IaaS (Infrastructure-as-a-Service) market. When reserved instance pricing includes an on-demand price component in addition to a reservation fee (two-part tariffs), different providers might offer different price combinations, where the client’s choice depends on its load profile. We investigate a duopoly of providers and analyze stable market prices in two-part tariffs. Further, we study offers that allow a specified amount of included usage (three-part tariffs). Neither two-part nor three-part tariffs produce an equilibrium market outcome other than a service pricing that equals production cost, i.e., complex price structures do not significantly affect the results from ordinary Bertrand competition.


Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information

S. Brangewitz, C. Haake, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013


Negotiating Transfer Prices

C. Haake, J.T. Martini, Group Decision and Negotiation (2012), pp. 657-680


On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU

C. Haake, T. Krieger, S. Minter, International Economics and Economic Policy (2012), pp. 583-612



Proportionality and the power of unequal parties

D. Dimitrov, C. Haake, International Journal of Economic Theory (2011), pp. 189-200

In this paper we introduce the concept of an overall power function that is meant to combine two sources of a party’s power in a parliament. The first source is based on the possibilities for the party to be part of a majority coalition and it is typically modeled using a cooperative simple game. The second source takes into account parties’ asymmetries outside the cooperative game and it is displayed by a vector of exogenously given weights. We adopt a normative point of view and provide an axiomatic characterization of a specific overall power function, in which the weights enter in a proportional fashion.



C. Haake, International Game Theory Review (2009), pp. 15-32

We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among themselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the specifications, this procedure serves to achieve bargaining solutions such as the discrete Raiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The latter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is readily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential.


Two support results for the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets

C. Haake, Mathematical Social Sciences (2008), pp. 177-187


Stable governments and the semistrict core

D. Dimitrov, C. Haake, Games and Economic Behavior (2008), pp. 460-475


The Shapley value of phylogenetic trees

C. Haake, A. Kashiwada, F.E. Su, Journal of Mathematical Biology (2008), pp. 479-497


Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts

C. Haake, B. Klaus, Economic Theory (2008), pp. 393-410


Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples

C. Haake, B. Klaus, Theory and Decision (2008), pp. 537-554


On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules

C. Haake, W. Trockel, Review of Economic Design (2008), pp. 17-25


Comments on: Transversality of the Shapley value

C. Haake, TOP (2008), pp. 48-50



A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions

D. Dimitrov, C. Haake, Social Choice and Welfare (2007), pp. 571-579



Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods

C. Haake, B. Klaus, D. Dimitrov, Economics Letters (2006), pp. 106-110

Government versus Opposition: Who Should be Who in the 16th German Bundestag?

D. Dimitrov, C. Haake, Journal of Economics (2006), pp. 115-128



Trading bargaining weights

C. Haake, U. Ervig, Journal of Mathematical Economics (2005), pp. 983-993


Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems

C. Haake, M. Raith, F.E. Su, Social Choice and Welfare (2002), pp. 723-749

Open list in Research Information System

An overview over the range of courses of Prof. Dr. Claus-Jochen Haake can be found here.

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An overview over the research projects and publications of Prof. Dr. Claus-Jochen Haake can be found here. 

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