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Open list in Research Information System

2018

A Duration Model Analysis of Consumer Preferences and Determinants of Video Game Consumption

D. Kaimann, N. Stroh-Maraun, J. Cox, Journal of Consumer Behaviour (2018), pp. 290 - 301

DOI

The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information

C. Haake, S. Recker, to appear in Group Decision and Negotiation (2018)

Abstract

In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness.


Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value

M. Feldotto, C. Haake, A. Skopalik, N. Stroh-Maraun, in: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), 2018

Abstract

We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted) average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation profiles are incomplete.


On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem

C. Haake, C. Qin, 2018

Abstract

We establish axioms under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the CES function and is unique up to specification of the distribution and elasticity parameters. This solution is referred to as the CES solution which includes the NASH and egalitarian solutions as special cases. Next, we consider a normalization of the CES function and establish axioms, under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the normalized CES and is unique up to the specifications of the distribution and its substitution parameters. We refer to this solution as the normalized CES solution, which includes the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as special cases. Our paper contributes to bargaining theory by establishing unified characterizations of existing as well as a great variety of new bargaining solutions.


Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games

S. Hoof, 2018

Abstract

This note deals with agreeability in nontransferable utility (NTU) differential games. We introduce state feedback Pareto weights to enrich the set of efficient cooperative solutions. The framework is particularly useful if constant weights fail to support agreeability, but cooperation is desired nonetheless. The concept is applied to an adverting differential game.


Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences

C. Haake, N. Stroh-Maraun, Economics Letters (2018), pp. 39 - 41

Abstract

We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.


2017

Thoughts on Social Design

W. Trockel, C. Haake, 2017


Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate

S. Brangewitz, B. Djawadi, R. Fahr, C. Haake, Universität Paderborn, 2017


Variety in the video game industry: An empirical study of the Wundt curve

D. Kaimann, N. Stroh-Maraun, J. Cox, Managerial and Decision Economics (2017)

DOI

More than skills: A novel matching proposal for multiplayer video games

N. Stroh-Maraun, D. Kaimann, J. Cox, Entertainment Computing (2017), pp. 26-36

DOI

Constitutions and groups

A. Mauleon, N. Roehl, V. Vannetelbosch, Games and Economic Behavior (2017), pp. 135-152

DOI

Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse

B. Hoyer, N. Stroh-Maraun, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2017

Abstract

In actual school choice applications the theoretical underpinnings of the Boston School Choice Mechanism (BM) (complete information and rationality of the agents) are often not given. We analyze the actual behavior of agents in such a matching mechanism, using data from the matching mechanism currently used in a clearinghouse at a faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the BM is used, and supplement this data with data generated in a survey among students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 70% of students act strategically. Controlling for students' limited information, we find that they do act rationally in their decision to act strategically. While students thus seem to react to the incentives to act strategically under the BM, they do not seem to be able to use this to their own advantage. However, those students acting in line with their beliefs manage a significantly better personal outcome than those who do not. We also run simulations by using a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm, adapted to our situation, to show that the use of a different algorithm may be to the students' advantage.


2016

Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product Innovation

J. Manegold, 2016

Abstract

On an intermediate goods market we consider vertical and horizontal product differentiation and analyze the impact of simultaneous competition for resources and the demand of customers on the market outcome. Asymmetries between intermediaries may arise due to distinct product qualities as well as by reasons of different production technologies. The intermediaries compete on the output market by choosing production quantities sequentially and for the supplies of a monopolistic input supplier on the input market. It turns out that there exist differences in product quality and productivities such that an intermediary being the Stackelberg leader has no incentive to procure inputs, whereas in the role of the Stackelberg follower will participate in the market. Moreover, we find that given an intermediary is more competitive, his equilibrium output quantity is higher when being the leader than when being the follower. Interestingly, if the intermediary is less competitive and goods are complements, there may exist asymmetries such that an intermediary being in the position of the Stackelberg follower offers higher output quantities in equilibrium than when being in the position of the Stackelberg leader.


On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein's Game

P. Duman, W. Trockel, Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design (2016), pp. 83-106

DOI

Sustainability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition

S. Brangewitz, S. Brockhoff, European Journal of Political Economy (2016), pp. 1-23

DOI

Identifying the preferences and heterogeneity of consumer groups in multiplayer video games

D. Kaimann, N. Stroh-Maraun, J. Cox, 2016

Abstract

Video games are high-involvement products with multiplatform and multiplayer characteristics, which aim to enhance consumer utility by providing opportunities for ‘playful consumption’. However, relatively little research has previously been undertaken into preferences for playful consumption, particularly in the context of multiplayer video games. This study addresses this deficiency in the literature through the analysis of data from a popular online game that includes historic behavioral data for 7 million consumers participating in 868,000 unique game rounds. Our analysis of these data identify the behavioral preferences of consumers in order to identify the factors associated with variations in consumer participation and engagement. We show that consumers value opportunities for score enhancement, with a preference for combat rather than non-combat actions. However, our findings also suggest that consumers value variety and heterogeneity as part of the experience, suffering disutility from factors such as the absence of particular player-roles or vehicle use within a given round. Our results represent the first such evidence on ‘in-game’ consumer preferences and the optimization of the video gaming experience, which has important implications for player matching, utility and willingness to pay for additional content.


Economic Aspects of Service Composition: Price Negotiations and Quality Investments

S. Brangewitz, S. Hoof, in: Service-Oriented and Cloud Computing: 5th IFIP WG 2.14 European Conference, ESOCC 2016, Vienna, Austria, September 5-7, 2016, Proceedings, 2016, pp. 201-215

DOI
Abstract

We analyse the economic interaction on the market for composed services. Typically, as providers of composed services, intermediaries interact on the sales side with users and on the procurement side with providers of single services. Thus, in how far a user request can be met often crucially depends on the prices and qualities of the different single services used in the composition. We study an intermediary who purchases two complementary single services and combines them. The prices paid to the service providers are determined by simultaneous multilateral Nash bargaining between the intermediary and the respective service provider. By using a function with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) to determine the quality of the composed service, we allow for complementary as well as substitutable degrees of the providers' service qualities. We investigate quality investments of service providers and the corresponding evolution of the single service quality within a differential game framework.


Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War

T. Gries, C. Haake, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy (2016)

DOI

Competition of Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly

S. Brangewitz, J. Manegold, Theoretical Economics Letters (2016), pp. 1341-1362

DOI
Abstract

On an intermediate goods market with asymmetric production technologies as well as vertical and horizontal product differentiation we analyze the influence of simultaneous competition for resources and customers. The intermediaries face either price or quantity competition on the output market and a monopolistic, strategically acting supplier on the input market. We find that there exist quality and productivity differences such that for quantity competition only one intermediary is willing to procure inputs from the input supplier, while for price competition both intermediaries are willing to purchase inputs. Moreover, the well-known welfare advantage of price competition can in general be no longer confirmed in our model with an endogenous input market and asymmetric intermediaries.


2015

The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Intrafirm Transfer Pricing

S. Brangewitz, C. Haake, Center for International Economics Working Paper No. 64, 2015


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