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Publikation des Papers “Using Loss Aversion to Incentivize Energy Efficiency in a Principal Agent Context - Evidence from a Field Experiment”

Das Paper “Using Loss Aversion to Incentivize Energy Efficiency in a Principal Agent Context - Evidence from a Field Experiment” von Frau Prof. Dr. Kirsten Thommes (gemeinsam mit Christin Hoffmann von der btu Cottbus) wurde zur Publikation bei Economics Letters angenommen.

Highlights:

  • A field experiment with truck drivers is conducted to motivate energy-efficient driving behavior.
  • Loss- and gain-framed bonus schemes are offered to drivers in repeated situations.
  • Gain framing is more effective, particularly for initially high-performing drivers.
  • Results may be driven by a relatively low bonus, heterogonous prior performance, and deprivation/negative reciprocity in persistent labor market relations.

Abstract:

Promoting energy-efficient behavior of agents in a principal–agent context simultaneously decreases costs for firms and mitigates CO2 emissions. Along this line, we analyze the effect of incentive framing on energy-efficient driving behavior. Our results contribute to the understanding of the drawbacks of loss framing. In a situation with persistent labor market relations, an extremely low bonus, and heterogeneous prior performance, the introduction of a bonus framed as a gain outperforms that of a bonus framed as a loss.

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